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NOTES 
HOME RULES:  THE CASE FOR LOCAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
Casey Adams* 
 
Administrative law is critical to the modern practice of governance.  
Administrative rules fill the gaps in statutes left open by lawmakers, allow 
agencies to exercise legislative grants of authority and discretion, and give 
agencies with subject-matter expertise and frontline experience the 
opportunity to promulgate detailed standards and requirements in their 
designated issue areas.  Adjudication allows an agency to dispose of matters 
and disputes formally before it, whether under its rules or another source of 
law.  While agencies at every level of government—federal, state, and local—
engage in administrative action, legal scholarship on administrative law is 
almost exclusively focused on the federal realm, which is shaped by the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  States can look to a Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act drafted by experts at the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, a document that was originally 
promulgated around the same time as the federal Administrative Procedure 
Act, for guidance on ordering the activities of their agencies.  Local 
governments, however, have far fewer resources to draw upon. 
This Note argues that the time has come for localities to embrace the 
codification of administrative procedures.  The governments and agencies of 
localities have always played a prominent role in the everyday lives of 
residents, as well as regional and national economic structures, and their 
work will benefit from procedural statutes.  Cities, in particular, have taken 
on an increasingly central role as political agents and policy entrepreneurs 
and this shift underscores the need for greater procedural guidance.  To 
make the case, this Note briefly examines the purposes and history of modern 
administrative law, analyzes approaches taken by exemplar cities, lays out 
and probes some of arguments for and against more rigorous procedures at 
the local level, and proposes three methods to help localities and states 
undertake this project. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2019, Fordham University School of Law; Director of City Legislative 
Affairs, New York City Department of Consumer Affairs.  I would like to thank Professor 
Nestor Davidson for his guidance and encouragement during this process and my colleagues 
at DCA for their feedback and mentorship.  All views expressed in this Note are mine alone. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The average city dweller, and particularly the average business owner, 
interacts with local rules multiple times a day.  Consider the example of an 
average small business in Chicago.  The corner eatery that a commuter might 
visit for a pick-me-up coffee on the way to work or a quick lunch must be 
licensed as a Retail Food Establishment by the Department of Business 
Affairs and Consumer Protection, which imposes rules regulating refund 
policy postings and price labeling for goods.1  The business must also comply 
with public health and sanitation rules promulgated by the Chicago Board of 
Health,2 which cover such granular topics as the concentration of caustic soda 
required in certain cleaning solutions,3 the proper method for affixing 
required source identification tags to shellfish containers,4 and the legally 
permissible method for reheating custard.5 
The administrative rules imposing these requirements are not always easy 
to find.  If the business owner were to search online and locate the “City of 
Chicago Rules and Regulations Portal,” she would discover a warning posted 
on the site’s sidebar: 
The City of Chicago Rules and/or any other documents that appear on this 
site may not reflect the most current Rules adopted by a City of Chicago 
Department.  The City of Chicago provides these documents in one location 
for informational purposes.  These documents should not be relied upon as 
the definitive authority for local administrative rules.  The City of Chicago 
department that issued the Rules should be consulted prior to any action 
being taken in reliance upon a City of Chicago rule.6 
Perhaps recognizing the potential for confusion, Chicago’s government 
created a “Restaurant Start-up Program”7 to help prospective entrepreneurs 
navigate the array of steps required for a new business to get up and running 
in a legally compliant fashion.  At the other end of the administrative process, 
a business that wishes to contest a violation received for failing to comply 
with any of the rules mentioned might discover that the prosecutor and judge 
at its hearing are, in fact, the same person.8  The point of these examples is 
 
 1. CHI. DEP’T OF BUS. AFFAIRS & CONSUMER PROT., RETAILER’S RULES (2015), 
https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/dol/rulesandregs/RetailersRules.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VUN8-NAWZ]. 
 2. CHI. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, SANITATION PRACTICES IN FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS 
(2014), https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/dol/rulesandregs/FoodCode 
Cover5516.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA5W-ZXNS]. 
 3. Id. at 14. 
 4. Id. at 10–11. 
 5. Id. at 7. 
 6. City of Chicago Rules and Regulations Portal, CITY CHI., 
https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/dol/rules-and-regulations-portal.html 
[https://perma.cc/6YY4-ACCC] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 7. Restaurant Start-up Program, CITY CHI., https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/ 
depts/bacp/sbc/restaurantstartupprogram.html [https://perma.cc/62F3-MTRT] (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2018). 
 8. See Stone St. Partners, LLC v. City of Chicago, 91 N.E.3d 965, 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2017).  Relying on Scott v. Department of Commerce & Community Affairs, 416 N.E.2d 1082 
(Ill. 1981), the court found that combining investigatory and adjudicatory roles in one 
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not to suggest that any of Chicago’s regulations are unnecessary; rather, it is 
to demonstrate that local regulations are widespread and, consequently, the 
procedures by which they are promulgated, enforced, and adjudicated matter 
to people’s lives.  As Michael Lipsky put it in his seminal study of local 
bureaucracies in the 1980s, “The ways in which street-level bureaucrats 
deliver benefits and sanctions structure and delimit people’s lives and 
opportunities.  These ways orient and provide the social (and political) 
contexts in which people act.”9 
The experience of a restaurant owner in Chicago can be traced to the legal 
framework by which the city’s agencies operate.  Unlike some other large 
cities in the United States, Chicago does not have a local administrative 
procedure act (LAPA) that governs the process for agencies to promulgate 
and codify administrative rules and adjudicate alleged violations.  This lack 
of uniformity at the lowest level of government stands in contrast to the state 
and federal structures:  the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
became law in 1946,10 and today, all fifty states have some form of state 
administrative procedure act (SAPA).11  Because there is no procedural 
statute, Chicago’s agencies are free to promulgate rules without public input, 
and there is no centrally codified compilation of rules for businesses and 
individuals to consult.  Chicago’s lack of opportunities for meaningful public 
engagement in the rulemaking process puts it in the company of countries 
like the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Turkey.12  Similarly, 
Chicago’s agencies are free to adjudicate violations that can result in 
substantial fines using a system that collapses the roles of prosecutor and 
judge into one. 
Chicago is not alone.  Many other large American cities, including Los 
Angeles, Houston, and Phoenix, also lack a procedural statute.  The rarity of 
local procedural statutes may be partly explained by the absence of a model 
statute that is crafted for the unique needs of municipalities for these local 
governments to imitate, adapt, and adopt.  Since 1946, states have had such 
 
administrative law judge did not violate the respondent’s constitutional due process rights 
absent a showing that the official was biased or otherwise predisposed to rule against it. 
 9. MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY:  DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
PUBLIC SERVICE 4 (2010). 
 10. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 5 (1947). 
 11. Jim Rossi, Politics, Institutions, and Administrative Procedure:  What Exactly Do We 
Know from the Empirical Study of State Level APAs, and What More Can We Learn?, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV. 961, 976–80 (2006). 
 12. See Melissa Johns & Valentina Saltane, Citizen Engagement in Rulemaking:  
Evidence on Regulatory Practices in 185 Countries 30–33 (World Bank Grp., Working Paper 
No. 7840, 2016), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/462571475068174273/pdf/ 
WPS7840.pdf [https://perma.cc/42SM-BQN8].  Johns and Saltane use an inventory of six 
indicators to calculate a composite score for citizen engagement in rulemaking, with zero 
being the lowest and six being the highest scores possible. Id. at 20.  Chicago would score one 
point on the publication of proposed regulations indicator because it posts proposed 
regulations on a unified website and would score zero on all other indicators, which relate to 
consultation with the public and regulatory-impact analyses.  The federal government of the 
United States scores a six. Id. at 33. 
2018] HOME RULES 633 
a model—the Model State Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA)—
developed contemporaneously with the APA by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).13  Since then, the 
NCCUSL has revised or rewritten the MSAPA three times:  in 1961, 1981, 
and most recently in 2010.14 
This Note argues that it is time for cities and localities to embrace 
administrative procedure.  The codification of administrative procedures for 
rulemaking and adjudication would enhance procedural protections for the 
public, result in fairer and more uniform outcomes, infuse those outcomes 
with greater legitimacy, and promote the creation of better informed and 
more effective rules.  To understand the need for administrative procedure in 
government, it is necessary to reexamine the background of federal and state 
administrative law, explore existing local models, and analyze the particular 
needs of local governments.  This Note begins by briefly examining the 
history, structure, purposes, and evolution of the APA and the MSAPA.  
Next, it surveys and analyzes the administrative approaches taken by New 
York, Philadelphia, and Seattle to illustrate the variety of administrative 
procedures that cities have already adopted.  Third, it considers arguments 
for and against the adoption of robust administrative procedures at the local 
level.  Finally, it sketches three ways in which local administrative procedure 
could be advanced:  (1) development of a model local administrative 
procedure act in the vein of the MSAPA; (2) adapting the MSAPA to the 
needs of local governments; or (3) encouraging local governments to 
construct new procedural statutes from the ground up.  Along the way, this 
Note highlights the growing importance of local administrative law, a field 
that is ripe for scholarly attention.  An exploration of the issues surrounding 
local administrative law provides useful context for those interested in 
exploring the questions, challenges, and possibilities presented by agency 
action at the level of government closest to the people it represents. 
I.  ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY:  APA AND MSAPA 
Local administrative law has grown up in the shadow of federal and state 
administrative law.  To see why administrative procedure is important to 
governments big and small, it is useful to examine how it evolved at these 
other levels of government.  The APA15 governs the federal rulemaking and 
adjudicatory processes and was enacted in 1946 to “achieve relative 
uniformity in the administrative machinery of the Federal Government.”16  
The statute serves as a baseline procedural guide for federal agencies, one 
that can be varied and customized by Congress to fit the particular needs of 
 
 13. Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 
297, 298–99 (1986). 
 14. Id. at 299–300; Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking Under the 2010 Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act, 20 WIDENER L.J. 855, 858 (2011). 
 15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–54 (2012). 
 16. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 5. 
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different agencies.17  The 1946 MSAPA, which provided a model procedural 
statute governing rulemaking and adjudication for state governments, was 
developed at the same time.18  “[T]here was substantial communication 
between the drafters of the two acts.”19  The drafters of the MSAPA, 
recognizing that the details of administrative and agency procedure and 
jurisdiction vary greatly between states, focused on crafting a statute that 
captured “essential features” of administrative procedure so that it could be 
adapted and applied broadly.20  Early drafters of the MSAPA articulated their 
goals as “fairness to the parties involved and creation of procedure that is 
effective from the standpoint of government.”21  Today, forty states and the 
District of Columbia have administrative procedure acts that were adopted in 
whole or in part from a version of the MSAPA.22 
A.  Federal Administrative Procedure Act 
The APA itself is relatively sparse, but a rich and complex body of 
administrative law, jurisprudence, and scholarship has grown up around the 
limited wording of the statute.  In the most basic terms, the APA divides 
agency action into two buckets:  rulemaking and adjudication.  It also 
provides procedural requirements for both types of actions within two 
subcategories:  formal and informal. 
1.  Rulemaking 
Rules are the basic tool for agencies to set prospective directives, 
standards, or prohibitions that carry the force of law.23  Formal rulemaking 
requires an agency to hold a public hearing at which agency leadership or an 
administrative law judge presides to take testimony, gather evidence, rule on 
procedural requests, and conduct a hearing in a manner that resembles a 
formal court proceeding.24  Formal rulemaking has been in retreat since the 
1970s and is only rarely used by federal agencies today.25  Informal 
rulemaking, also known as “notice-and-comment” rulemaking, is much more 
 
 17. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57b-3 (2012) (setting forth special rulemaking procedures for 
the Federal Trade Commission). 
 18. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT prefatory note at 1 (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010) [hereinafter 2010 MSAPA]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. prefatory note at 1–2. 
 23. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012) (“‘[R]ule’ means the whole or a part of an agency statement 
of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or 
prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of 
an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate 
or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or 
allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the 
foregoing.”). 
 24. Id. §§ 556–57. 
 25. Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 241 
(2014). 
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common.  Notice-and-comment rulemaking in the APA requires an agency 
to follow a three-step procedure:  (1) issue a general notice of proposed 
rulemaking; (2) allow interested persons an opportunity to participate by the 
submission of written data, views, or arguments; and (3) include a concise 
general statement of basis and purpose when the final rule is promulgated.26 
Agencies usually choose to prepare an Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (ANPRM) for publication in the Federal Register that invites the 
public to participate in the shaping of the rule at the conceptual stage by 
submitting comments, information, and studies, though this is not required.27  
An ANPRM is followed by a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that 
contains the actual text of the proposed rule and is also published in the 
Federal Register for public comment.28  When an agency publishes a final 
rule, it must “consider and respond to significant comments” in the statement 
of basis and purpose.29 
In practice, agencies fulfill the obligation to consider and respond to 
substantive comments by incorporating summaries of comment content with 
agency responses into the statement of basis and purpose that accompanies 
the final rule.  For example, in 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau received more than 160 comments before adopting a final rule 
amending the regulations that govern certain aspects of mortgage 
financing.30  In its statement of basis and purpose, the agency summarized 
concerns raised by these comments and explained its response to suggestions 
by consumer advocacy groups that the agency require disclosures in multiple 
languages in order to better inform consumers with limited English 
proficiency.31  Although the agency ultimately did not alter the rule to include 
this language requirement, the agency’s response served the purpose of 
informing the public of the reasons for that decision and assuring commenters 
that their concerns had been carefully considered.32  In this case, the agency 
noted that it had not had the opportunity to test the disclosure in multiple 
languages or seek comment from regulated entities about the operational 
challenges involved with providing multilingual disclosures.33 
Not all the procedural requirements for rulemaking are captured in the 
APA.  Cost-benefit analysis has been a mandated part of the federal 
rulemaking process since President Reagan signed Executive Order 12,291 
in 1982.34  President Reagan’s order required that any “major rule”—defined 
 
 26. 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015). 
 27. Office of the Fed. Register, A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, FED. REG., 
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H75W-MCFD] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1203. 
 30. Amendments to the 2013 Mortgage Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 81 Fed. Reg. 
72,160, 72,163 (proposed Nov. 20, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1024, 1026). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 72,164. 
 34. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
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as any regulation likely to result in an annual economic effect of $100 million 
or more; a major effect on consumers, industries, or governments; or 
significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, 
productivity, innovation, or the ability of American companies to compete 
with international counterparts—undergo review to ensure that “regulatory 
action . . . not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society . . . 
outweigh the potential costs to society.”35  The final word on cost-benefit 
analysis belongs to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which functions as the 
“guardian of a well-functioning administrative process.”36  President 
Reagan’s executive order was replaced by President Clinton’s Executive 
Order 12,866, which preserved the government’s commitment to cost-benefit 
analysis while expanding the scope of consideration to include costs and 
benefits that are not readily quantifiable in monetary terms.37  Under this 
structure, OIRA reviews a portion of final rules and conducts more searching 
reviews of all major rules.  From fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2016, 
OMB reviewed 2670 of the 36,255 final rules published in the Federal 
Register, of which 609 were considered major rules.38 
Put simply, cost-benefit analysis involves the quantification and 
monetization of the burdens imposed by an action as well as the reduction in 
risk of the targeted harm and a weighing of the resulting figures.39  
Proponents of cost-benefit analysis claim that it yields many advantages for 
agencies and the public.  First and foremost, requiring cost-benefit analysis 
ensures that all regulations produce a net benefit to society, rather than simply 
imposing costly burdens on particular communities or industries.  Scholars 
also claim a host of other secondary benefits—for example, that requiring 
cost-benefit analysis in the first instance compels agencies to think critically 
about the basis for a regulation and the effectiveness of its proposed measures 
rather than simply relying on “dogmas, intuitions, hunches, or interest-group 
pressures.”40  In so doing, cost-benefit analysis purportedly promotes the 
 
 35. Id. at 13,193. 
 36. Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs:  Myths and 
Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1841 (2013). 
 37. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). President Obama 
supplemented the order with Executive Order 13,563 which, inter alia, encourages agencies 
to seek input from interested stakeholders before a NPRM is published and make rulemaking 
dockets available online at regulations.gov. 3 C.F.R. 215 (2011).  Shortly after taking office, 
President Trump issued his own executive order instituting a “regulatory cap” that requires 
agencies to identify two regulations for repeal whenever they propose a rule for notice and 
comment. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
 38. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2017 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS 
AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED 
MANDATES REFORM ACT 8 (2018). 
 39. John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation:  Case Studies and 
Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 893 (2015). 
 40. Cass R. Sunstein, Financial Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 124 YALE L.J.F. 
263, 263 (2015). 
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creation of rules that are more efficient, less burdensome, and more narrowly 
tailored to the problems that they are meant to address.41 
2.  Adjudication 
Adjudication is the process by which an agency can issue a final, binding 
order to resolve a matter.42  Strictly speaking, the final disposition of any 
matter other than rulemaking is an adjudication.43  The APA addresses itself 
primarily to formal adjudications.  The statute provides detailed procedures 
for the conduct of formal adjudications and leaves it to the discretion of 
agencies to determine proper procedures for informal adjudications, subject 
to the ultimate constraints of constitutional due process and APA judicial 
review standards.44 
Section 554 of the APA sets out the requirements for adjudications.45  The 
section applies to every case required by statute to “be determined on the 
record after an opportunity for a hearing”—a phrase that denotes the 
 
 41. Of course, cost-benefit analysis is not without its drawbacks or criticisms.  Inevitably, 
cost-benefit analysis adds another step to an already time-consuming process for promulgating 
rules.  Skeptics also point out that cost-benefit analysis as a tool of regulatory reform has its 
roots in conservative academia and that the requirement “has been used as a screen for 
ideologically driven attacks on regulation.” Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1355, 1355 (2009).  In addition, scholars have observed 
that both the framing of regulatory problems as market failures and the drive to maximize net 
benefits using economically quantifiable factors make cost-benefit analysis a poor tool for 
addressing, or even acknowledging, concerns of distributive justice, individual rights, and 
fairness in the rulemaking process. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit 
Analysis in Its Place:  Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335, 339 (2011).  
Despite these critiques, cost-benefit analysis remains deeply rooted in the federal regulatory 
firmament.  Indeed, President Obama reaffirmed the primacy of cost-benefit analysis early in 
his first term by issuing his own executive order and appointing Cass Sunstein, a law professor 
who has authored several books and many law review articles about the importance of cost-
benefit analysis, as the administrator of OIRA. See generally Sunstein, supra note 36.  It 
remains to be seen how the tenure of President Trump’s OIRA Administrator, Neomi Rao, 
will impact the evolution of cost-benefit analysis and executive regulatory review more 
generally. See Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion:  How Delegation Diminishes the 
Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1525 (2015) (asserting that “[t]he vast and 
varied bureaucracy undermines both the unitary executive and the collective Congress.”).  
There is already evidence that President Trump’s administration has reduced the pace of 
regulatory action compared to previous governments. See Connor Raso, Where and Why Has 
Agency Rulemaking Declined Under Trump?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/where-and-why-has-agency-rulemaking-declined-
under-trump/ [https://perma.cc/L2KR-UWFA] (finding that “total rulemaking fell 
significantly under Trump [in 2017] relative to 2001, 2009, and 2016”). 
 42. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2012) provides that an “order,” the result of an agency 
adjudication, means “the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, 
injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but 
including licensing.” 
 43. Id. 
 44. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) 
(“But this much is absolutely clear.  Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling 
circumstances the ‘administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of 
procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their 
multitudinous duties.’” (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965))). 
 45. 5 U.S.C. § 554. 
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requirement of formal adjudication.46  Section 554(b) requires that all 
persons entitled to notice of a hearing be timely informed of the time, place, 
and nature of the hearing, the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the 
hearing is to be held, and the matters of fact and law asserted.47  Section 
554(c) requires that agencies give all interested parties the opportunity to 
submit facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or “proposals of adjustment” 
of the matter at issue and empowers the agency to issue binding decisions 
should these attempts to resolve the matter fail.48  Section 554(d) sets out 
restrictions on ex parte communications and conflict of interest standards for 
agency employees who preside over adjudications.49  Section 554(e) 
empowers agencies to issue binding declaratory orders within their 
discretion.50 
APA requirements for hearings and decisions apply to both formal 
rulemaking and formal adjudication; though, as noted above, the former is 
rarely done today.51  These requirements are laid out in sections 556 and 557 
of the APA.  Section 556(b) requires that the agency head or an 
administrative law judge (ALJ) preside at the taking of evidence.52  Section 
556(c) sets out the powers of presiding employees, which include 
administering oaths and affirmations, issuing subpoenas, ruling on evidence 
proffers, taking depositions, regulating the course of the hearing, holding 
settlement conferences, informing the parties of the availability of alternative 
dispute resolution, disposing of procedural requests, making or 
recommending decisions in accordance with section 557, and taking other 
actions as authorized by agency rules.53  Section 556(d) places the burden of 
proof on the proponent of a rule or order and requires an agency to provide 
for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence.54  
This provision also specifies that parties may present their case or defense by 
oral or documentary evidence, submit rebuttal evidence, and conduct cross-
examinations.55  Finally, section 556(e) declares that a record created 
pursuant to section 556 is the exclusive record for decision and requires that 
an agency make copies of the record available to the parties.56 
Section 557 of the APA governs agency decisions after hearings.57  
Section 557(b) provides that, unless an agency has promulgated a rule 
 
 46. Id. § 554(a).  But see Nielson, supra note 25, at 240 (finding that formal rulemaking 
is rare in the modern era).  The question of when, precisely, formal adjudication is required 
by the APA is complex and the ongoing debate prompted the MSAPA drafters to chart a 
different course for addressing the issue. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 47. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(1)–(3). 
 48. Id. § 554(c). 
 49. Id. § 554(d). 
 50. Id. § 554(e). 
 51. Id. § 556(a). 
 52. Id. § 556(b). 
 53. Id. § 556(c). 
 54. Id. § 556(d). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. § 556(e). 
 57. Id. § 557(a). 
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requiring otherwise, subordinate employees who preside over hearings may 
make initial decisions that become final in the absence of a party appeal or 
agency request for review.58  Alternatively, an agency may require that 
subordinate employees recommend a decision to the agency head, who 
makes the final decision.59  Section 557(c) provides that before an initial 
decision, recommended decision, or a final decision on agency review can be 
made, parties must have a chance to submit proposed findings and 
conclusions, exceptions to the decision, and supporting reasons for either of 
these items.60  A decision must include findings and conclusions, with a 
statement of reasons and basis on all material issues of fact, law, or 
discretion, and clearly state the outcome of the adjudication.61  Section 
557(d) provides restrictions on ex parte communications and conflict of 
interest standards for agency employees who are likely to be involved in the 
decisional process.62 
Federal agencies undertake a staggering number of adjudications.  Just one 
agency, the Social Security Administration (SSA), issued more than 650,000 
hearing decisions in the 2016 fiscal year alone.63  Decisions in SSA 
adjudications can determine a party’s eligibility to access important benefits, 
including retirement income for paid-in individuals or their survivors, 
disability insurance, and supplemental security income.64  The SSA example 
demonstrates how the APA shapes millions of potentially high-stakes 
interactions between citizens and federal agencies every year. 
B.  Model State Administrative Procedure Act 
The MSAPA, unlike the APA, has changed significantly since 1946.  
NCCUSL revised the MSAPA in 1961, 1981, and most recently in 2010.65  
This Note focuses on analyzing the 2010 revision of the MSAPA.  Although 
no state has yet adopted the most recent MSAPA, it represents the 
NCCUSL’s latest effort to capture evolutions in state administrative law and 
includes several innovations that would be of interest to a local government 
considering the codification of administrative procedure.66 
 
 58. Id. § 557(b). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. § 557(c)(1)–(3). 
 61. Id. § 557(c)(3)(A)–(B); see also Iowa State Commerce Comm’n v. Office of Fed. 
Inspector of Alaska Nat. Gas Transp. Sys., 730 F.2d 1566, 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[W]e 
believe that the [agency] does have an obligation to state sufficient findings and reasons 
supporting its decision to permit . . . judicial review . . . .”). 
 62. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1). 
 63. National Hearing Decisions (FY 2014–FYTD 2018 Quarter 3), SOC. SECURITY 
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/charts/National_Hearing_Decisions_FY2018_3rd_ 
Qtr.pdf [https://perma.cc/H93J-PNB2] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 64. Hearings and Appeals, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/ 
about_us.html [https://perma.cc/HY5W-5S6V] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 65. 2010 MSAPA, supra note 18, prefatory note at 1–2. 
 66. Enactment Status Map, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ 
Act.aspx?title=State%20Administrative%20Procedure%20Act,%20Revised%20Model 
[https://perma.cc/C3WS-ZQSE] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
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1.  Rulemaking 
The MSAPA provides for notice-and-comment rulemaking that is broadly 
similar to that found in the APA but incorporates new options for agencies 
as well as additional procedural safeguards for the public.  Agency 
rulemaking actions are not valid unless they are conducted in “substantial 
compliance” with procedural requirements.67 
The 2010 MSAPA first lays out several requirements for the public 
availability of certain rulemaking documents.  For example, the statute 
contemplates that a state has either engaged a publisher or assigned a public 
official to:  (1) establish a regulatory bulletin similar to the Federal Register 
in which rulemaking notices may be published and (2) compile and codify 
regulations in an official compendium.68  Agencies must maintain 
rulemaking records and dockets, the latter of which must be copied and 
provided to members of the public upon request.69  The purpose of these 
provisions is to “provide easy public access to agency law and policy that are 
relevant to agency process.”70  Unlike previous versions of the MSAPA, the 
2010 MSAPA requires that agencies also make rulemaking documents 
available online.71 
An agency is authorized to “gather information relevant to the subject 
matter of a potential rulemaking proceeding and . . . solicit comments and 
recommendations from the public” using advance notices of proposed 
rulemaking, which are also a common tool in the federal context.72  
Negotiated rulemaking, wherein an agency convenes a committee of 
stakeholders impacted by a proposed rule to achieve consensus before the 
notice of proposed rulemaking is published, is also authorized.73 
Notice of proposed rules must be published for public comment in advance 
of adoption, though the statute allows for adjustments in the length of the 
comment period.74  Several elements must be included in the notice, 
including a short explanation of the proposed rule, citations to legal authority, 
 
 67. 2010 MSAPA, supra note 18, § 315. 
 68. Id. § 201. 
 69. Id. §§ 301–02. 
 70. Id. § 201 cmt. 
 71. Id. § 202. 
 72. Id. § 303(a). 
 73. Id. § 303(b).  Negotiated rulemaking proceeds upon the theory that, through 
prepublication consensus, “the adversarial process would be supplanted by a cooperative 
process, and the delay involved in judicial challenges would be avoided.” William Funk, 
Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law—Three Examples as an Object 
Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 193 (2009).  But note that negotiated rulemaking “never 
became generally accepted.” Id.  Funk theorizes that this is because the benefits for agencies 
in terms of fewer hostile comments and decreased likelihood of judicial review failed to 
clearly materialize. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus:  The Promise and 
Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1309 (1997) (analyzing outcomes 
of negotiated rulemakings by the Environmental Protection Agency and finding that 
“[n]egotiated rulemaking saves no appreciable amount of time nor reduces the rate of 
litigation”). 
 74. 2010 MSAPA, supra note 18, § 304. 
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disclosure of relied-upon studies and technical analyses, a regulatory-impact 
analysis if one was prepared, and instructions for commenting.75 
The MSAPA includes a form of regulatory-impact analysis that 
approximates OIRA review of major rules at the federal level.76  States are 
encouraged to set their own threshold for triggering these analyses before the 
publication of proposed rules as they deem appropriate.77 
After a proposed rule is published, an agency must take comments in an 
electronic or written format.78  Agencies are not required to hold public 
hearings, but may choose to do so.79  Importantly, the MSAPA specifies that 
an ongoing comment period does not “prohibit[] . . . an agency from 
discussing with any person at any time the subject of a proposed rule,”80 
which removes any potential cloud on an agency’s ability to communicate 
freely about a regulatory topic while a rulemaking proceeding is pending. 
Agencies may not adopt a rule until after the public comment period 
ends.81  Within two years of the publication of a proposed rule, an agency 
must either adopt a final rule or terminate the rulemaking proceeding.82  Final 
rules may vary from those proposed rules only if the variance is a “logical 
outgrowth” of the proposed rule.83  Final rules must include a concise 
explanatory statement laying out:  (1) the agency’s reasons for adopting the 
rule and, if applicable, for not accepting substantial arguments made by the 
public; (2) the reasons for any variance between the proposed and final rules; 
and (3) the summary of any regulatory analysis performed.84 
The MSAPA provides agencies with two alternative rulemaking 
procedures for special circumstances.  First, an agency may adopt an 
emergency rule, which can only be effective for an initial 180 days and may 
be renewed for another 180 days upon a finding that “an imminent peril to 
the public health, safety, or welfare or the loss of federal funding for an 
agency program” makes such an adoption necessary.85  Second, an agency 
 
 75. Id. § 304(a)(1)–(7). 
 76. Id. § 305. 
 77. Id. § 305 cmt. (“States should set the dollar amount of estimated economic impact for 
triggering the regulatory analysis requirement of this section at a dollar amount so that as [sic] 
they deem appropriate or by other approach make the choice to prepare regulatory analyses 
carefully so that the number of regulatory analyses prepared by any agency are proportionate 
to the resources that are available.”). 
 78. Id. § 306(a). 
 79. Id. § 306(c). 
 80. Id. § 306(b). 
 81. Id. § 307(a). 
 82. Id. § 307(b). 
 83. Id. § 308; see First Am. Disc. Corp. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 222 
F.3d 1008, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“The test for a ‘logical outgrowth,’ variously phrased, is 
whether a reasonable commenter ‘should have anticipated that such a requirement’ would be 
promulgated, or whether the notice was ‘sufficient to advise interested parties that comments 
directed to the’ controverted aspect of the final rule should have been made.” (citations 
omitted) (first quoting Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 
547 (D.C. Cir. 1983); then quoting Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 
1991))). 
 84. 2010 MSAPA, supra note 18, § 313. 
 85. Id. § 309. 
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may adopt a “direct final rule” that it expects to be noncontroversial without 
public comment unless an objection is received after publication, in which 
case the rule cannot be adopted and the agency must proceed under normal 
rulemaking procedures.86 
Members of the public may petition agencies for the adoption of a rule.87  
If such a petition is received, an agency must either initiate rulemaking or 
deny the petition and state its reasoning on the record within a specified time 
period.88 
The MSAPA provides agencies with two additional regulatory tools.  First, 
agencies may issue guidance documents without going through the normal 
rulemaking procedure.89  This provision is meant to “encourage an agency to 
advise the public of its current opinions, approaches, and likely courses of 
action.”90  Second, agencies may, upon petition, make declaratory orders that 
specify how a rule will be applied to a particular party.91  These orders are 
binding as to the parties and facts at issue, and they are meant to serve as 
“convenient procedural device[s] that will enable parties to obtain reliable 
advice from an agency.”92 
Finally, the MSAPA includes a Legislative Rules Review Committee.93  
This committee, proposed to be made up of members of the legislature, has 
the power to approve, disapprove outright, or disapprove the rule with 
recommended modifications.94  A similar mechanism, the Congressional 
Review Act, exists at the federal level but functions quite differently because 
it is an ex post legislative override rather than a pre-adoption review.95 
The MSAPA’s rulemaking procedures clearly evidence the drafters’ desire 
to provide flexibility to both agencies and interested parties while preserving 
a predictable structure for rulemaking and procedural safeguards for the 
public.  On the whole, this approach seems to have succeeded—agencies 
have the tools to effectively make rules in a variety of circumstances.  
Agencies can negotiate highly technical rules with impacted stakeholders, 
quickly adopt noncontroversial regulations as direct final rules, or engage in 
standard notice-and-comment rulemaking with or without an actual public 
hearing.  At the same time, agencies must share useful information with the 
public and state the reasons for their administrative choices in ways that are 
accessible, easy to understand, and susceptible to judicial review. 
 
 86. Id. § 310. 
 87. Id. § 318. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. § 311(a). 
 90. Id. § 311 cmt. 
 91. Id. § 204(e). 
 92. Id. § 204 cmt. 
 93. Id. § 702. 
 94. Id. § 703(a). 
 95. See 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2012). 
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2.  Adjudications 
The MSAPA divides agency adjudications into two categories:  
(1) adjudications where an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing is required 
by a federal or state constitution or statute, known as “contested cases”; and 
(2) all other processes by which agencies determine facts or apply law in 
order to formulate and issue an order.96 
Contested cases, which are roughly equivalent to formal adjudications 
under the APA, trigger much more exacting procedural requirements than 
other adjudications.  An agency must appoint a presiding officer who is an 
administrative law judge and is not subject to the authority, direction, or 
discretion of anyone who has served as an investigator, prosecutor, or 
advocate in the case subject to disqualification for bias, prejudice, financial 
interest, ex parte communication, or any other factor that would cause a 
reasonable person to question his or her impartiality.97  An agency must give 
parties timely notice, a public hearing, and the opportunity to file pleadings, 
motions, and objections as well as respond, present evidence and argument, 
conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal evidence.98  The statute also 
sets out rules of evidence99 and discovery100 as well as requirements for 
notice,101 hearing records,102 ex parte communications,103 intervention by 
other parties,104 issuance of subpoenas,105 entry of default judgments,106 
issuance of recommended, initial, or final orders,107 agency review and 
reconsideration,108 and stays of agency orders pending judicial review.109  As 
a result, the procedural and agency resource requirements for an adjudication 
change dramatically depending on whether a case is contested or not.110 
In contrast, other agency adjudications, roughly equivalent to informal 
adjudications under the APA, carry significantly fewer and less burdensome 
procedural requirements.  Informal adjudications are subject to the general 
judicial review standards and provisions governing agency departure from 
 
 96. 2010 MSAPA, supra note 18, § 102(1), (7). 
 97. Id. § 402. 
 98. Id. § 403. 
 99. Id. § 404. 
 100. Id. § 411. 
 101. Id. § 405. 
 102. Id. § 406. 
 103. Id. § 408. 
 104. Id. § 409. 
 105. Id. § 410. 
 106. Id. § 412. 
 107. Id. § 413. 
 108. Id. §§ 414–16. 
 109. Id. § 417. 
 110. This “procedural cliff” is sometimes referred to as the “gateway problem.”  The two 
basic approaches are the internal model, where the procedural statute attempts to define what 
kinds of circumstances should warrant formal procedures, and the external model, where the 
procedural statute relies on other sources of law for the trigger.  Both the APA and the 2010 
MSAPA take the latter approach. See Michael Asimow, Contested Issues in Contested Cases:  
Adjudication Under the 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 20 WIDENER L.J. 
707, 713–14 (2011). 
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public guidance documents.111  By adopting a structure that grants significant 
procedural protections for parties in contested cases and prescribes no 
process for informal adjudications, the statute balances the agency’s interest 
in flexibility with the public’s interest in predictable, formal, and 
procedurally rigorous proceedings where significant rights or penalties are at 
issue.112 
The final element of the MSAPA’s approach to adjudication is the 
establishment of an Office of Administrative Hearings to serve as a central 
panel for adjudications.  When the 2010 MSAPA was adopted, twenty-four 
states and the District of Columbia already took such an approach.113  The 
2010 MSAPA builds on an innovation initially included in the 1981 MSAPA 
in order to “balance due process concerns with administrative effectiveness 
while retaining administrative law independence.”114  A Chief ALJ is 
appointed by the appropriate executive branch official and may only be 
removed for cause.115  Subordinate ALJs are appointed by the Chief and are 
similarly protected from dismissal without cause.116  Central panels are 
meant to increase efficiency and fairness by leveraging economies of scale 
and providing for uniform rules and independent adjudicators.117 
Many of the default tools and protections that the MSAPA provides to state 
agencies and the public, both for rulemaking and adjudications, are not 
unique to that level of government and would no doubt be useful for local 
agencies as well.  Other parts of the statute, such as the procedural 
requirements for contested-case adjudications or the central panel proposal, 
could serve as useful starting points for crafting local-level analogues. 
C.  Comparison 
The APA and the MSAPA have both similarities and differences.  Both 
statutes leave some degree of flexibility for agencies in the rulemaking and 
adjudication contexts for different but related reasons.  The drafters of the 
APA had to account for the wide variety of procedures used and subject 
matter addressed across the administrative spectrum of the federal 
 
 111. 2010 MSAPA, supra note 18, § 401 cmt. 
 112. Contested-case provisions were first introduced in the widely adopted 1961 MSAPA 
and, as a result, most states have some form of them on the books today. See Rossi, supra note 
11, at 976–80.  However, much can turn on precisely how a state defines the phrase “contested 
case.” See generally Jennifer Lumley-Hluska, Note, The Contest over “Contested Cases”:  A 
Study on How the Connecticut Legislature’s Reading of Two Words May Be Depriving You of 
Your Right to Judicial Review and Due Process of the Law, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1239 
(2005). 
 113. 2010 MSAPA, supra note 18, § 601 cmt. 
 114. Ed. Schoenbaum, A Brief History of the Model Act to Create a State Central Hearing 
Agency, 17 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 309, 309 (1997). 
 115. 2010 MSAPA, supra note 18, § 602. 
 116. Id. § 603. 
 117. John Hardwicke & Thomas E. Ewing, The Central Panel:  A Response to Critics, 24 
J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 231, 232 (2004) (pointing out, and attempting to rebut, 
common criticisms of the central panel model, including cost, loss of agency expertise, 
excessive formalization of administrative hearings, and creation of more state bureaucracy). 
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government, while the drafters of MSAPA had to account for the diverse 
structures and needs of state governments.  The MSAPA has benefitted from 
more frequent and recent updates,118 while the APA has changed only 
incrementally since its enactment.119  An examination of the different choices 
made by the drafters of each statute will demonstrate how the goals and 
structure of an act’s institutional audience can shape the way its procedures 
are crafted. 
In the rulemaking context, the MSAPA provides agencies with more 
options and flexibility than the APA, but also more thoroughly codifies the 
steps involved in its wider array of procedures.  For example, the MSAPA 
provides for direct final rule procedures for rules expected to be 
noncontroversial, an option that does not appear in the APA.120  In addition, 
many of the elements of rulemaking at the federal level that have been 
overlaid on the APA statute by executive order or agency practice, such as 
advance notices of rulemaking and regulatory-impact review, are explicitly 
codified in the MSAPA.121 
There are significant differences in the ways that the APA and the MSAPA 
approach adjudication.  The first and most fundamental difference is the 
contested-case framework.122  While both the APA and MSAPA follow an 
external model that applies formal (or contested) adjudication procedures 
according to the mandates of external sources of law, the contested-case 
approach was deliberately developed as an alternative to the APA to avoid 
its pitfalls.123  In particular, the contested-case provisions are meant to avoid 
the APA’s ambiguity about when a formal hearing is required.124  The APA 
simply states that formal adjudications apply “in every case of adjudication 
required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an 
agency hearing.”125  However, the statute provides no guidance for 
determining when a statute appropriately directs that a hearing must be held 
“on the record.”  As a result, courts are split on the question of when this 
threshold has been met:  one line of cases holds that a statute must expressly 
require a hearing on the record, while another holds that, where the rights at 
issue are significant, a hearing must be on the record unless a statute 
expressly provides that it need not be.126 
 
 118. See supra notes 14, 65 and accompanying text. 
 119. Compare Administrative Procedure Act, Pub L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) 
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), with Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 
89-554, chs. 5–8, 80 Stat. 378, 380–93 (recodifying the APA), and Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183 (amending the APA’s adjudication procedures). 
 120. 2010 MSAPA, supra note 18, § 310. 
 121. Id. §§ 303, 305. 
 122. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 123. See supra note 110. 
 124. See supra note 110. 
 125. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012). 
 126. Compare City of West Chicago v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 701 F.2d 632, 
644–45 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that formal adjudications are only mandated where Congress 
has indicated its intent to require them in the statute at issue), with Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 
564 F.2d 1253, 1264 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that the question of when a hearing must be on 
the record can only be resolved by determining whether the “nature of the administrative 
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The MSAPA avoids this issue by making it clear that the default rule is 
that a formal hearing is required where the statute calls for any type of 
evidentiary hearing.127  This scheme applies equally to evidentiary hearings 
required by statute or federal and state constitutions.128  An “evidentiary 
hearing” is a hearing for the receipt of evidence regarding issues on which a 
decision of the presiding officer may be made in a contested case.129  As a 
result, if a legislature wants to provide for a hearing that need not conform 
with contested-case procedures, it must state that preference expressly in the 
statute.130  The contested-case approach is also intended to avoid sweeping 
in trivial matters for costly and time-consuming adjudication because it 
applies to only those rights that a legislature has already marked out as in 
need of the extra protection afforded by an agency hearing. 
The point of this discussion is not to put a finger on the scale for one 
approach or the other.  Rather, it is to highlight that the APA and MSAPA 
take very different approaches to the same issues.  These differences create 
rich veins of varied experiences and carefully honed best practices, across 
federal agencies and state governments, for scholars and local governments 
interested in crafting robust administrative procedure to mine. 
II.  LOCAL APPROACHES TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
Several cities have already recognized the need for administrative 
procedure and taken action.  An examination of existing city statutes provides 
useful information about the approaches these cities have already crafted and 
tested that can be probed for both best practices and, in some cases, 
precedents to avoid.  This Part examines the procedural statutes of three 
cities:  New York, Philadelphia, and Seattle.  New York and Philadelphia 
were chosen because, of the top ten most populous cities in the United States, 
they are the only two that have procedural statutes.  Seattle is included to add 
geographic diversity and because its statute is particularly robust. 
A.  New York City 
In New York City, agency procedures are regulated by the City 
Administrative Procedure Act (CAPA), which comprises Chapter 45 of the 
 
determination . . . fall[s] . . . within the category of proceedings Congress sought to address in 
the APA,” and that the absence of the words “on the record” is not dispositive).  For further 
discussion, see Asimow, supra note 110, at 715 n.39 (examining the differences between these 
approaches) and William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing Rights:  An Unintended 
Combination, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 249, 297 (2009) (detailing the differing approaches to 
deference with respect to formal adjudication requirements and arguing that “it is 
inconceivable that Congress intended to delegate to agencies the question of whether the 
agencies themselves are governed by the requirement of a neutral decisionmaker, the 
prohibition on ex parte contacts, or the other procedural protections . . . of the APA”). 
 127. 2010 MSAPA, supra note 18, § 102 cmt. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. § 102(11). 
 130. Asimow, supra note 110, at 715 (“If the Legislature wants to depart from the default, 
it should say so.”). 
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New York City Charter (“Charter”).131  CAPA was proposed by the Charter 
Revision Commission (“Commission”) in 1988 and approved by referendum 
in November of that year.132  In its final report recommending CAPA to 
voters, the Commission outlined its guiding principles for the rulemaking 
structure:  agency procedures must inform the public and seek its input, and 
rules must be accessible, up to date, and easy to understand for the 
layperson.133  CAPA also defined the word “rule” in local law for the first 
time in an effort to standardize the form by which agencies promulgate 
prospective standards that directly affect the public.134  While CAPA has 
been amended several times since its addition to the Charter, the procedure 
it established remains largely intact and still governs agency rulemaking and 
adjudication today.  The fact that New York City’s administrative procedures 
are part of its foundational document points to the importance the 
Commission and, by extension, referendum voters placed on these 
provisions. 
1.  Rulemaking 
CAPA defines a rule as “the whole or part of any statement or 
communication of general applicability that (i) implements or applies law or 
policy, or (ii) prescribes the procedural requirements of an agency including 
an amendment, suspension, or repeal of any such statement or 
communication.”135  The Charter goes on to specifically include within the 
definition of “rule” any communication which sets a standard that may result 
in a penalty; establishes a fee; prescribes standards for the suspension or 
revocation of a license or permit; sets product, material, or service standards; 
regulates procedures for the procurement or disposition of public property; 
or sets standards for the granting of loans or other benefits.136  Specifically 
exempted from the definition are communications related to internal 
management or personnel, merely explanatory clarifications of agency 
policy, arrangement of personnel or agency resources, traffic guidance and 
street closings, Districting Commission actions, and several categories of 
land-use actions.137  Later case law honed the definition by holding that “only 
a fixed, general principle to be applied by an administrative agency without 
regard to other facts and circumstances relevant to the regulatory scheme of 
the statute it administers constitutes a rule or regulation.”138  Additionally, 
rules were described as “rigid, numerical polic[ies] invariably applied across-
 
 131. N.Y.C., N.Y., CHARTER §§ 1041–47 (2018). 
 132. See 1 N.Y.C. CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER 
REVISION COMMISSION DECEMBER 1986–NOVEMBER 1988 32–36 (1989). 
 133. Id. at 32–33. 
 134. N.Y.C., N.Y., CHARTER § 1041(5). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. § 1041(5)(a). 
 137. Id. § 1041(5)(b). 
 138. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 666 N.E.2d 1336, 1137–38 (N.Y. 
1996). 
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the-board to all claimants without regard to individualized circumstances or 
mitigating factors.”139 
Once an agency determines that its statement qualifies as a rule, it must 
submit the proposed rule to the New York City Corporation Counsel 
(“Counsel”) and the Mayor’s Office of Operations (“Ops”) for review and 
certification.  Counsel’s review is focused on situating the proposed rule 
within the framework of existing regulations and ensuring that the agency is 
not acting outside its authority,140 while Ops’s review examines how the rule 
will impact members of the public and regulated communities.141  The New 
York City Council enacted the certification requirement to “ensure that, 
among other things, new or modified rules are not unduly burdensome and 
do not create unnecessarily high compliance costs for the regulated 
community.”142  In practice, the certifications provided by Counsel and Ops 
take the form of bare affirmations and do not provide substantive analysis of 
the questions enumerated in CAPA for review by interested members of the 
public.143 
After certification, proposed rules, including a statement of basis and 
purpose laying out the statutory authority for promulgation, must be sent to 
the City Record—a municipal publication similar in function to the Federal 
Register—for publication at least thirty days prior to the scheduled date of a 
 
 139. Schwartfigure v. Hartnett, 632 N.E.2d 434, 436 (N.Y. 1994).  While both New York 
City Transit Authority and Schwartfigure interpret the New York State Administrative 
Procedure Act (SAPA) definition of a “rule,” codified at N.Y. A.P.A. Law section 102(2), the 
definition used by CAPA is substantively identical and courts frequently apply interpretations 
of substantively similar SAPA definitions to their CAPA equivalents. See, e.g., Council of 
N.Y. v. Dep’t of Homeless Servs., 3 N.E.3d 128, 129–30 (N.Y. 2013) (applying the New York 
City Transit Authority and Schwartfigure interpretations of the definition of “rule” under 
SAPA to same term under CAPA). 
 140. N.Y.C., N.Y., CHARTER § 1043(d)(1).  Counsel is required to certify that the rule:   
(i) is drafted so as to accomplish the purpose of the authorizing provisions of law; 
(ii) is not in conflict with other applicable rules; (iii) to the extent practicable and 
appropriate, is narrowly drawn to achieve its stated purpose; and (iv) to the extent 
practicable and appropriate, contains a statement of basis and purpose that provides 
a clear explanation of the rule and the requirements imposed by the rule. 
Id. 
 141. Id. Ops is required to state: 
(a) whether such rule is understandable and written in plain language; (b) how the 
drafting process of the rule, to the extent practicable and appropriate, included 
analysis sufficient to minimize the compliance costs for the discrete regulated 
community or communities, to the extent one exists, consistent with achieving the 
stated purpose of the rule; and (c) why, in the event such rule involves the 
establishment of a violation, modification of a violation or modification of the 
penalties associated with a violation without also including a cure period, or other 
opportunity for ameliorative action by the party or parties subject to enforcement, 
such cure period or other opportunity for ameliorative action was not included. 
Id. 
 142. N.Y.C. COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DIVISION ON PROPOSED 
INT. NO. 91-A, at 3 (2010) (on file with author). 
 143. See, e.g., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING AND 
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON PROPOSED RULES 6–7 (2017), http://rules.cityofnewyork.us/ 
sites/default/files/proposed_rules_pdf/dca_proposed_rule_re_petroleum_product_signs_com
bined.pdf [https://perma.cc/KUA9-5V65]. 
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hearing at which the public may comment.144  Simultaneously, the agency 
must publish the proposed rule and hearing information on the New York 
City Rules website, an online portal that allows members of the public to 
comment easily online.145  Agencies must also transmit the proposed rule to 
the City Council, Community Boards, news desks, and civic 
organizations.146  These publications mark the start of the public comment 
period, during which members of the public can submit comments or 
feedback on the rule by fax, mail, email, or through the rules portal.147 
Public hearings are typically held at the conclusion of the comment period.  
Once the comment period closes, agencies must make public comments, 
including a summary of any oral testimony delivered at the hearing, available 
for inspection.148  Agencies must consider “relevant comments,” and, while 
they are under no obligation to respond, they may revise the rule in response 
to comments without restarting the CAPA process.149  An agency may adopt 
a final rule, which can only become effective thirty days after publication in 
the City Record.150  Most rules take at least four to six months to progress 
through all of CAPA’s required steps, though the timeline can vary greatly 
due to factors like the complexity of the rule and the workloads of the 
promulgating agency, Counsel, and Ops.  CAPA also includes an expedited 
emergency rulemaking procedure for cases where a rule is “necessary to 
address an imminent threat to health, safety, property or a necessary 
service.”151 
Every agency must publish an annual regulatory agenda.152  The agenda 
must provide a brief description of subject areas in which the agency 
anticipates promulgating rules and explanations for the decision to make 
rules; a summary of rule contents; a summary of possibly duplicated, 
overlapping, or conflicting federal, state, and local laws; and an approximate 
schedule for rulemaking actions.153  If an agency proposes or adopts a rule 
not on its regulatory agenda, the agency must state the reason for the rule’s 
absence from the agenda in its statement of basis and purpose.154 
2.  Adjudication 
CAPA provides considerably less guidance for adjudication procedures 
than it does for rulemaking procedures.  The statute contemplates that more 
 
 144. N.Y.C., N.Y., CHARTER § 1043(b). 
 145. Id.; see also N.Y.C. RULES, http://rules.cityofnewyork.us/ [https://perma.cc/2Y9M-
ALT6] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 146. N.Y.C., N.Y., CHARTER § 1043(b). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. § 1043(h). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. § 1043(f). 
 151. Id. § 1043(i)(1). 
 152. Id. § 1042; see, e.g., N.Y.C. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs Regulatory Agenda for FY 
2018, N.Y.C. RULES (May 2017), http://rules.cityofnewyork.us/sites/default/files/downloads/ 
dca_fy_2018_regulatory_agenda_4-25_clean.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EDX-K7TL]. 
 153. N.Y.C., N.Y., CHARTER § 1042(a)(1)–(5). 
 154. Id. § 1042(c). 
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exacting procedures may be applied to agencies by stating that they “shall 
act, at a minimum, in accordance with the provisions set forth below.”155  The 
term “adjudication” is defined as “a proceeding in which the legal rights, 
duties, or privileges of named parties are required by law to be determined 
by an agency on a record and after an opportunity for a hearing.”156  The rest 
of the adjudication provision specifies minimum procedural requirements for 
notice and hearing.157 
Notice under CAPA requires that an agency provide a party with 
information about the nature, time, and location of the proceeding.  In 
addition, agencies must provide a statement of the legal authority and 
jurisdiction under which the adjudication is to be held with references to 
particular sections of the laws and rules concerned as well as a “short and 
plain statement of the matters to be adjudicated,” again with references to 
particular sections.158 
CAPA provides for adjudicatory hearings overseen by an independent 
hearing officer.159  Hearings must be provided within a reasonable time and 
parties must be given the opportunity to be represented by counsel, issue 
subpoenas or request that they be issued, call and cross-examine witnesses, 
and present oral and written arguments.160  The burden of proof falls, by 
default, on the agency commencing the adjudication.161  With the exception 
of ministerial matters, ex parte communications are barred.162  Finally, 
CAPA expressly allows agencies and parties to, where not barred by law, 
informally dispose of matters by “methods of alternative dispute resolution, 
stipulation, agreed settlement, or consent order.”163 
The responsibility for carrying out adjudicatory hearings on behalf of 
agencies has largely been consolidated in the hands of a centralized body, the 
Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH).164  This process has 
been ongoing since voters approved amendments to the Charter giving the 
mayor greater powers to consolidate scattered agency tribunals in 2010.165  
 
 155. Id. § 1046 (emphasis added). 
 156. Id. § 1041(1). 
 157. Id. § 1046. 
 158. Id. § 1046(a)(1)–(3). 
 159. Id. § 1046(e). 
 160. Id. § 1046(c)(1). 
 161. Id. § 1046(c)(2). 
 162. Id. § 1046(c)(1). 
 163. Id. § 1046(d). 
 164. Id. § 1049(2)(a) (“The chief administrative law judge shall establish rules for the 
conduct of hearings, in accordance with the requirements of [CAPA].”). 
 165. N.Y.C. CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE 2010 NEW YORK CITY 
CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION 37 (2010), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/charter/ 
downloads/pdf/final_report_of_the_2010_charter_revision_commission_9-1-10.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DF8W-AVKA] (“To accomplish consolidation, the Commission 
recommends that the Charter be amended to authorize the Mayor to transfer the adjudicatory 
functions of various tribunals . . . under the umbrella of a single tribunal/agency.”); see, e.g., 
Transfer of Certain Tribunals and Adjudicatory Functions Consistent with Mayor’s 
Committee Report, Executive Order No. 148, at 2 (Office of the Mayor, City of N.Y. 2011), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ajc/downloads/pdf/eo_148.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF84-7VGE] 
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The move toward consolidation in a central tribunal has been praised by those 
who argue that OATH’s adjudication procedures have placed New York City 
on “the cutting-edge of access to justice for self-represented litigants and 
those with Limited English Proficiency”166 and is responsive to the same set 
of concerns that underlies the central panel approach in the 2010 MSAPA.167  
In 2016, OATH’s Trials Division, which oversees more complex issues and 
appeals from agency decisions, resolved 2611 cases.168  The Hearings 
Division, which resolves routine summonses issued by other agencies, 
received more than 840,000 cases in 2016, more than half of which were filed 
by the Department of Sanitation.169 
B.  Philadelphia 
Philadelphia’s administrative procedures are governed by a mix of state 
and local law.  Like New York, Philadelphia enshrines rulemaking 
procedures in its city charter. 
1.  Rulemaking 
The rulemaking process for Philadelphia’s agencies is laid out in the city’s 
Home Rule Charter.  Departments, boards, and commissions are 
presumptively authorized to make “such reasonable regulations as may be 
necessary and appropriate in the exercise of [their] powers and performance 
of [their] duties under this charter or under any statute or ordinance.”170  
Before regulations are promulgated, they must be submitted to the Law 
Department for approval “to assure that they are authorized, comply with 
basic legislation, and do not exceed constitutional limits.”171  Once it is 
approved, the rule is submitted to the Department of Records and made 
available for public inspection for thirty days.172  The Department of Records 
must give public notice of a rule filing by advertising in the newspaper that 
has the largest paid circulation in the city, in the official legal newspaper, and 
on the city’s official website.173  During the filing period, any person affected 
by the rule may request a public hearing before the promulgating agency and 
the city solicitor by making a written request to the Department of 
 
(transferring the administrative tribunals of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and 
the Taxi and Limousine Commission to OATH). 
 166. Sherry M. Cohen & Joanna Weiss, Know Your Audience:  How NYC Tribunals Have 
Addressed Self-Represented Litigants and Increased Access to Justice, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 485, 486 (2009).  See generally David B. Goldin & Martha I. Casey, 
New York City Administrative Tribunals:  A Case Study in Opportunity for Court Reform, 49 
JUDGES’ J., Winter 2010, at 20. 
 167. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 168. OFFICE OF ADMIN. TRIALS AND HEARINGS, ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2016), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/oath/downloads/pdf/OATH-Annual-Report-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RFC5-NHJP]. 
 169. Id. at 9. 
 170. PHILA., PA., HOME RULE CHARTER § 8-407 (2018). 
 171. Id. § 8-407(a) annot. 4. 
 172. Id. § 8-407(a). 
 173. PHILA., PA. CODE § 21-1703(2)(b), (e) (2018). 
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Records.174  If a hearing is requested and held, the promulgating agency must 
file a report with the Department of Records either reaffirming the 
regulations or modifying them with the approval of the Law Department.175  
Regulations become effective thirty days after publication if no hearing is 
held or ten days after the filing of a hearing report if a hearing is requested 
and held.176  Like New York, Philadelphia’s rulemaking procedure includes 
an expedited option for use in emergencies that affect public health or 
safety.177 
Philadelphia’s rulemaking procedure differs from New York City’s 
procedure in two major ways.  First, Philadelphia’s agencies are, by default, 
not required to accept comments or hold a public hearing.  A hearing will 
only occur, and public comments will only be accepted, if the agency so 
chooses or an affected member of the public requests it.178  Second, 
Philadelphia has a one-step promulgation process rather than New York 
City’s two-step process.  Instead of publishing a proposed rule, collecting 
comments, and then publishing and adopting a final rule, Philadelphia’s 
agencies simply publish what they intend to be the final rule.  If no affected 
member of the public files a written request for a hearing, the rule will 
become final with no further action on the agency’s part.179  If a request is 
filed, the agency must hold a public hearing, accept public comments, and 
then respond to those comments in a lengthy hearing report.180 
Philadelphia’s rulemaking procedure appears designed to better align the 
expenditure of public resources by public agencies with the level of public 
interest or concern in a rule.  It is easy to see how the default settings lessen 
the burden on agencies.  Noncontroversial rules can be promulgated much 
faster in Philadelphia than in New York City, where an agency must hold a 
public hearing on a proposed rule and then adopt a final rule regardless of the 
level of public interest or engagement.  Of the 178 rules listed on the public 
website maintained by the Philadelphia Department of Records, only fifteen 
of them were made subject to a public hearing.181  In other words, 92 percent 
of those rules became effective through the default settings specified in the 
Home Rule Charter with no public hearing.  The link between public interest 
and procedural requirements is not perfect, however.  Because agencies do 
not appear to take public comments unless a formal hearing is requested, the 
 
 174. PHILA., PA., HOME RULE CHARTER § 8-407(c). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 180. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE WATER COMMISSIONER ON THE PUBLIC HEARING WITH 
RESPECT TO PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE WATER DEPARTMENT’S REGULATIONS (2017), 
http://regulations.phila-records.com/pdfs/Philadelphia%20Water%20Department%20 
Regs%206-30-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WQB-FMXS] (summarizing and responding in 
detail to eight comments made by a local legal services group). 
 181. Regulations—List of Regulations Promulgated by the City, CITY PHILA., 
http://regulations.phila-records.com/ [https://perma.cc/HN3N-B62D] (last visited Oct. 4, 
2018). 
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mechanism is binary—agencies must do everything or nothing.  Therefore, a 
member of the public who wishes to submit substantial comments suggesting 
a total reworking of the regulation will trigger the same procedural response 
as a member of the public who wants to suggest adding a word to a definition.  
It is possible to imagine an approach that falls between these two poles by 
allowing members of the public to submit comments without triggering a full 
formal hearing unless they choose to do so. 
2.  Adjudication 
The procedural requirements for adjudications by Philadelphia’s agencies 
are fixed by the Local Agency Law, a Pennsylvania state statute.182  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has described the purpose of the statute as 
“provid[ing] a forum for the enforcement of statutory rights where no 
procedure otherwise exists.”183  While the Local Agency Law provides a 
procedural floor, it does not prevent agencies from setting forth more specific 
procedures for the conduct of adjudications.184  This section examines the 
minimum standard that Philadelphia’s agencies must comply with under state 
law. 
The Local Agency Law provides that parties may be represented at 
adjudications.185  Parties must be given reasonable notice of a hearing and an 
opportunity to be heard.186  Testimony at a hearing may be stenographically 
recorded and a record kept either by the agency or at the request of one of the 
parties.187  Agencies are not bound by rules of evidence, all relevant evidence 
of reasonably probative value may be admitted, and reasonable examination 
and cross-examination must be allowed.188  Finally, adjudications must 
contain findings and reasons and be served upon all parties personally or by 
mail.189  The statute also supplies the standard of judicial review—a court 
must affirm the adjudication unless it finds that the adjudication “is in 
violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant, or is not in accordance 
with law, or that [Local Agency Law procedural requirements] have been 
violated . . . or that any finding of fact by the agency and necessary to support 
its adjudication is not supported by substantial evidence.”190 
Philadelphia does not appear to have experienced the move toward 
consolidation seen in the 2010 MSAPA and in New York City.  At present, 
the city’s Bureau of Administrative Adjudication only provides hearings for 
 
 182. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 551–55 (2018). 
 183. Guthrie v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 478 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Pa. 1984) (quoting 
Boehm v. Bd. of Educ., 373 A.2d 1372, 1375 (Pa. 1977)). 
 184. See, e.g., Duncan v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2230 C.D. 2015, 2016 WL 4506134, at 
*3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 26, 2016) (observing that the Bureau of Administrative 
Adjudication “has promulgated regulations governing the conduct of its hearings”). 
 185. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 552. 
 186. Id. § 553. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. § 554. 
 189. Id. § 555. 
 190. Id. § 754(b). 
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people who wish to dispute parking tickets.191  Agencies conducting 
independent adjudications subject to the Local Agency Law include the 
Board of Pensions and Retirement,192 the Zoning Board of Adjustment,193 
and the Board of License and Inspection Review.194 
C.  Seattle 
Seattle’s procedural statute appears to be strongly influenced by the 1961 
MSAPA.  Referred to as the “Administrative Code,” the statute was first 
adopted in 1973.195 
1.  Rulemaking 
Seattle agencies must give at least fourteen days public notice of proposed 
rules by publishing a newspaper notice, and in some cases applicable trade, 
professional, or industry publications, and mailing materials to anyone with 
a standing request on file with the agency.196  The public notice must include 
a description of the authority authorizing the rule, the substance of the rule 
or subjects and issues involved, and the prescribed process for 
commenting.197  Agencies must give the public an opportunity to present 
data, views, or arguments, but they are not obligated to hold a public hearing 
and may limit public input to written presentations.198  The Administrative 
Code directs that agencies “[g]ive appropriate consideration to economic 
values, along with any environmental, social, health and safety factors,” in 
deciding to take any regulatory action but does not set forth a detailed process 
for regulatory review.199  Like other jurisdictions, Seattle’s Administrative 
Code (SAC) provides for an emergency rulemaking process in cases where 
immediate regulatory action is “necessary for the immediate preservation of 
the public peace, health or safety.”200  Members of the public may petition 
an agency for regulatory action and agencies are required to respond within 
sixty days by either initiating rulemaking or denying the petition with an 
 
 191. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication, CITY PHILA., https://beta.phila.gov/ 
departments/bureau-of-administrative-adjudication/ [https://perma.cc/57T7-WMSJ] (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 192. Wiggins v. Phila. Bd. of Pensions & Ret., 114 A.3d 66, 69 (Pa. 2015). 
 193. Batchelder v. Phila. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, No. 2376 C.D.2013, 2015 WL 
5555339, at *5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 5, 2015). 
 194. Soc’y Hill Civic Ass’n v. Phila. Bd. of License & Inspection Review, 905 A.2d 579, 
585 (Pa. 2006). 
 195. See Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 102,228 (May 5, 1978). 
 196. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 3.02.030(A) (2018). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. § 3.02.030(B).  The language used in this statute is very similar to that used in the 
1961 MSAPA:  the agency shall “afford all interested persons reasonable opportunity to 
submit data, views, or arguments, orally or in writing.” UNIF. LAW COMM’RS’ MODEL STATE 
ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 3(a)(2) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
1961) [hereinafter 1961 MSAPA], http://www.japc.state.fl.us/Documents/Publications/ 
USAPA/MSAPA1961.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZYJ-DYY7]. 
 199. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 3.02.030(C). 
 200. Id. § 3.02.050. 
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explanation.201  Similarly, agencies are authorized to make declaratory 
rulings as to the application of any of their rules to particular cases in 
response to petitions.202  Subject to the notice requirements described above, 
rules become effective upon filing with the city clerk.203 
Seattle represents something of a middle ground between the approaches 
taken by New York and Philadelphia.  Like Philadelphia, Seattle prescribes 
a one-step rulemaking process that does not require agencies to publish 
proposed and final rules separately and in sequence.204  Like New York, 
Seattle allows public comments by default rather than requiring a request for 
hearing as in Philadelphia.205  Seattle incorporates a regulatory-impact 
component in its requirement that agencies consider economic, 
environmental, social, health, and safety factors, though it is not clear how 
effective this is in the absence of a requirement that agencies explain their 
consideration of these factors or the establishment of insufficient 
consideration as a basis for judicial review.  Making public hearings optional 
does not appear to have caused agencies to abandon them; at least in some 
cases, the agencies hold hearings voluntarily.206 
2.  Adjudication 
The SAC incorporates the commonly adopted 1961 MSAPA model of 
contested cases.207  A contested case is defined as “any proceeding before an 
agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are 
required by ordinance to be determined after a hearing by a Hearing 
Examiner”—substantially the same as the 1961 MSAPA definition.208  The 
SAC also follows the 1961 MSAPA’s procedural rules for contested cases, 
with the exception that the rules of evidence are less exacting than those in 
the MSAPA, which largely imports judicial rules of evidence from state 
courts.209 
Seattle, like New York, has an independent, centralized administrative 
tribunal.210  The SAC creates the Office of the Hearing Examiner “for the 
conduct of hearings in rulemaking and contested cases.”211  The SAC sets 
 
 201. Id. § 3.02.040. 
 202. Id. § 3.02.080. 
 203. Id. § 3.02.060. 
 204. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 205. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 206. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Hearing and Opportunity to Comment, SEATTLE 
FIN. & ADMIN. SERVICES, https://web.archive.org/web/20171107182945/ 
http://www.seattle.gov/finance-and-administrative-services/directors-rules [https://perma.cc/ 
5W6Q-29BE] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (“The Department of Finance and Administrative 
Services has scheduled a public hearing on the proposed rule changes . . . .  All interested 
persons are invited to present data, views or arguments, with regard to the proposed rules, 
orally at the hearing or in writing at or before the hearing.”). 
 207. 1961 MSAPA, supra note 198, § 9. 
 208. Compare SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 3.02.020(B), with 1961 MSAPA, 
supra note 198, § 1(2). 
 209. 1961 MSAPA, supra note 198, § 10. 
 210. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 211. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 3.02.110(A). 
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forth a carefully prescribed method for filling the post of Hearing Examiner, 
candidates for which must be appointed by the City Council from a list of 
three names put forward by a committee composed of the Human Resources 
Director, the King County Ombudsman, and a private attorney selected by 
the local bar association.212  The Hearing Examiner is empowered to, among 
other things, administer oaths, examine witnesses, rule on evidence proffers, 
conduct discovery including depositions and interrogatories, serve subpoenas 
for the production of documents or attendance of witnesses, and preside over 
settlement conferences.213  The Hearing Examiner makes decisions or 
recommendations for decisions to agency heads in contested cases, 
depending on what procedure is provided for in the statute that triggers the 
hearing.214  In addition, the Hearing Examiner may hear appeals of decisions 
made by other agencies, such as those related to the issuance or denial of a 
license.215  The Hearing Examiner manages an average caseload of about 500 
cases annually, the majority of which are appeals of land use enforcement 
actions taken by the Department of Construction and Inspections.216 
All three cities have developed different approaches to administrative 
procedure.  Seattle’s statute is highly detailed and prescriptive, 
Philadelphia’s is relatively minimalist, and New York City’s is somewhere 
in the middle.  Both New York City and Seattle take unique, though not 
clearly successful, approaches to regulatory-impact analysis.  All three 
provide useful evidence that administrative procedure statutes can be crafted 
for, and successfully implemented by, local governments. 
III.  DUE CONSIDERATION:  ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST LOCAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
This Part discusses the case for codifying local administrative procedure 
and examines possible counterarguments.  Weighing in favor of codification 
are a desire for legitimacy, uniformity and basic fairness, and the potential 
for deliberative procedures to produce better rules.  Arguments against 
codification include concerns about local agency resources and fundamental 
questions about whether greater protections are even necessary at the local 
level. 
A.  Organizing the Administrative Machinery 
The strongest argument for increased procedural rigor is that all the 
justifications marshalled for the APA and the MSAPA apply with equal force 
at the local level.  The APA was meant to “achieve relative uniformity in the 
administrative machinery,”217 while the MSAPA was aimed at fostering 
 
 212. Id. § 3.02.110(B). 
 213. Id. § 3.02.120. 
 214. Id. § 3.02.100. 
 215. Id. § 3.02.115. 
 216. SEATTLE OFFICE OF HEARING EXAM’R, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 6 (2016), 
http://www.seattle.gov/examiner/docs/AR2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/68NJ-3DVY]. 
 217. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 5. 
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“fairness to the parties involved and [the] creation of procedure that is 
effective from the standpoint of government.”218  Localities, no less than 
states or the federal government, grapple with hard issues of governance and 
service delivery and would benefit from clear procedural guidelines for 
administrative and regulatory work.  In fact, in many respects, the actions of 
local governments can have an even more direct impact on the lives of 
residents than their state and federal counterparts.219  The same residents, 
communities, and businesses who benefit from the fairness, predictability, 
and stability that flow from uniformity and accessibility of state and federal 
government procedure will stand to benefit if those same elements are 
instilled in their local governments.  The same basic principles that drove the 
passage of the APA and the creation of the MSAPA militate in favor of 
administrative procedure requirements for local agencies. 
1.  Legitimacy 
A robust, public, deliberative process would promote the legitimacy of 
administrative action at the local level.  In order to articulate this point, it is 
useful to briefly describe the dominant model for understanding how federal 
agency actions are made theoretically legitimate:  the “presidential control” 
model.  This model emphasizes that agencies are “subject to the oversight 
and management” of the president.220  Accordingly, “[f]or legitimacy 
purposes, agency officials [stand] in the shoes of their boss; they [are] as 
accountable, faction-resistant, and efficacious as the president.”221  A federal 
agency’s actions are viewed through the lens of the president’s authority. 
This model is often difficult to adapt to the local level.  Unlike the federal 
government and many states, which have single, accountable executives to 
exercise legislatively granted authority and oversee agencies, local 
governments may take any of a number of different structures.222  Many, like 
council-manager cities, bear only passing resemblance to the state and 
 
 218. 2010 MSAPA, supra note 18, prefatory note at 1. 
 219. GERALD A. MCDONOUGH, 38 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & 
PRACTICE § 1:14 (2017) (“Arguably, the decision-making of local governmental agencies and 
officials might well be more in need of the assurance of fair procedures brought about by the 
operation of administrative procedure acts because such decision-making oftentimes would 
have a direct, vital, and immediate impact upon the lives and fortunes of the citizens in the 
local community.  To the extent that local government was the level of government closest to 
citizens, whose activities most directly impinged upon them, the necessity and desirability of 
a municipal administrative procedure act would appear to be apparent.”). 
 220. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State:  
A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 53 (2006). 
 221. Id.  The authors conducted an in-depth survey of federal agency officials to test the 
limits of the presidential control model and concluded that, in practice, “the presidential 
control model may not entirely succeed in enhancing agency legitimacy,” though they “do not 
suggest that the model lacks merit.” Id. at 99. 
 222. See Nestor Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 595–604 
(2017) (discussing the “tremendous institutional diversity” of local governments and their 
agencies and identifying three dimensions by which local structural distinctions can be 
catalogued:  vertical (state-local), horizontal (local fragmentation), and internal (differences 
in structure within local governments themselves)). 
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federal governmental structures.223  In many localities, it is much harder to 
draw a straight line between the authority of the executive and the legitimacy 
of the actions taken by his or her agencies than it is in the state or federal 
contexts.  Of course, this concern is less pressing for large cities that have 
powerful executives. 
The “deliberative” model provides a more satisfactory account of 
administrative legitimacy at the local level.  This model “focuses on the 
obligation of public officials to engage in reasoned deliberation on which 
courses of action will promote the public good.”224  Decisions are legitimate 
not because they can be traced back to the authority of a popularly elected 
executive, but “because each interest and perspective is treated with equal 
respect and arbitrary decision making is prohibited.”225  In order to earn this 
legitimacy, agency officials “must engage in a decision-making process that 
considers all of the relevant interests and perspectives, and they must provide 
reasoned explanations for their decisions that could reasonably be accepted 
by free and equal citizens with fundamentally competing perspectives.”226  
Of course, in order to satisfy the rigors of this framework, agencies must seek 
out and consider the input of the public—a process that is at the heart of 
procedural statutes.227  Agency officials must conduct rulemakings in the 
light of day and afford the public the opportunity to weigh in, and 
adjudications must be conducted according to standards of notice, proof, and 
judicial review.  The deliberative model is preferable for local administrative 
action because it focuses on the quality of the procedures that produce a 
decision rather than the authority derived from a centralized executive.  Even 
in large cities with structures that resemble the federal government, agencies 
can benefit from the legitimating function of a rigorous and publicly 
accountable deliberative process. 
 
 223. Id. at 601–03 (discussing structures of local government that depart from the federal 
model).  See generally Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities?  On 
the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542 (2006) (discussing 
the council-manager system of local government, which Schragger also terms the “weak 
mayor” form of government). 
 224. Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative 
Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 857 (2012). 
 225. Id. at 858. 
 226. Id. at 857. 
 227. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027–28 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“[Courts’] 
reliance on careful procedural review . . . derives from an expectation that if the Agency, in 
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rules.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 
F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968))); see also CARY COGLIANESE ET AL., TRANSPARENCY AND 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS:  A NONPARTISAN PRESIDENTIAL 
TRANSITION TASK FORCE REPORT 17 (2008), https://web.archive.org/web/20171228205952/ 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/regulation/transparencyReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4ZNE-R6Z3] (“[R]eforms that improve the degree and quality of public 
participation in the rulemaking process could contribute both to the creation of better rules 
and to the promotion of the underlying democratic values implicated in the administrative 
process.”). 
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2.  Uniformity and Fairness 
Local administrative procedure would promote efficiency and fairness by 
creating uniform procedures for rulemaking and adjudication.  It is an 
“elemental dictate of legal reasoning . . . [that] like cases should be treated 
alike.”228  In the absence of a procedural statute, different agencies within 
the same locality may take vastly different approaches to adjudications.  A 
proceeding conducted by one department may operate by entirely different 
rules of procedure, evidence, and disposition than a proceeding conducted by 
a different department housed in the same municipal building.  The same is 
true of rulemaking:  one agency may choose to have a sixty-day comment 
period concluding with a public hearing while another may opt to accept only 
written submissions for a two-week period.  A member of the public will 
simply have to accept a more restrictive opportunity for input if the issue they 
care about is under the jurisdiction of the latter agency.  Agencies are free to 
design whatever process they choose and are bound only by due process and 
the prospect of judicial review. 
Local procedural statutes would provide a uniform procedural baseline for 
agencies.  Members of the public would be assured of a minimum level of 
predictable procedure when interacting with agencies.  Agencies would be 
made to adhere to similar procedures for rulemaking and adjudication and, 
potentially, cases would be heard by a central, independent adjudicatory 
body.  At the same time, local governments could ensure that agencies would 
be free to supplement minimum procedures with additional measures as 
needed.  If, for example, an agency plans to undertake a technically 
complicated rulemaking and wants to hold a series of public hearings with 
experts on the issue, a statute providing minimum, not maximum, procedural 
standards would allow it to do so.  Alternatively, the enacting legislative body 
could specify more exacting procedural requirements for certain agencies.  
Greater codification of local administrative procedure would promote 
fairness by giving local governments the opportunity to make agency 
procedures for both adjudication and rulemaking more uniform and 
predictable for the public. 
3.  Utility 
Clearer administrative procedure would enhance the growing role of local 
governments as entrepreneurial policymaking agents.  Cities, the largest and 
most prominent of local governments, are increasingly taking the lead and 
experimenting with new programs and policies to serve their residents.  For 
example, in 2015, New York City rolled out a program that allows residents 
fourteen years or older to apply for a municipal identification card, a 
significant benefit for those who may not be able to access identification 
 
 228. Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 574 F.3d 1235, 1249 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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offered by other levels of government.229  The rules governing this program, 
now codified as Chapter 6 of Title 68 of the Rules of the City of New York, 
were promulgated through the CAPA process.230  Cities like New York, 
Seattle, and San Francisco are using rules to implement new laws that expand 
local regulation of labor practices, an area where the role of local 
governments was attenuated in recent years.231  The “stunning revival of 
cities” and their newfound demographic and economic success stories 
suggest that urban local governments may seek to continue to act as policy 
entrepreneurs.232  Crafting a procedural statute could itself be an opportunity 
for innovation.  It is not so unrealistic to imagine a locality integrating new 
ideas like citizen rulemaking—where members of the public get a first crack 
at drawing up regulations on an issue for the agencies to respond to and 
revise—into its administrative procedure act.233  Others have proposed 
“democracy index” rulemaking, which applies a sliding scale for agency-side 
requirements like regulatory review depending on the robustness of public 
participation in the comment period.234  Uniform procedures and best 
practices for administrative law would benefit both policymakers and 
residents in America’s rebounding cities and localities as they seek to explore 
new areas of policy. 
 
 229. See About IDNYC, NYC, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/idnyc/about/about.page 
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interaction with federal law, see generally Amy C. Torres, Note, “I Am Undocumented and a 
New Yorker”:  Affirmative City Citizenship and New York City’s IDNYC Program, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 335 (2017).  Rulemaking was frequently used by agencies during Michael 
Bloomberg’s mayoralty with mixed results.  Probably the most well-known instance of 
innovative but ill-fated rulemaking is the “soda ban,” or Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule, 
which was struck down by the New York Court of Appeals. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic 
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538, 541 
(N.Y. 2014).  For a discussion of that case and other instances in which New York City 
agencies have used rulemaking to promote public health and environmental policy, see 
generally Jason J. Czarnezki, New York City Rules!  Regulatory Models for Environmental 
and Public Health, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1621 (2015). 
 230. See 68 R.C.N.Y. §§ 6-01 to -12 (2018). 
 231. See, e.g., CITY & CTY. OF S.F. OFFICE OF LABOR STANDARDS ENF’T, FINAL RULES 
IMPLEMENTING THE FORMULA RETAIL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS ORDINANCES (FREROS) (2016), 
http://sfgov.org/olse/sites/default/files/Document/FRERO%20Final%20Rules.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A4XD-4FL7]. 
 232. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE NEW URBAN CRISIS 3 (2017).  Florida, whose theories about 
the potential for a new creative class to drive urban revival contributed to this wave of “urban 
optimists,” has since turned to a deeper examination of the problems that our cities create, 
perpetuate, and exacerbate. Id.  These include economic inequality, racial segregation through 
spatial sorting, and dwindling opportunities for residents of America’s suburbs. See Richard 
Voith & Susan Wachter, The Return of America’s Cities:  Economic Rebound and the Future 
of America’s Urban Centers, PENN INST. FOR URB. RES. (Aug. 12, 2014), 
http://penniur.upenn.edu/publications/the-return-of-americas-cities [https://perma.cc/AM6S-
P9HL]. 
 233. See, e.g., Brian Heaton, Why Not Let Citizens Draft Their Own Legislation?, 
GOVERNING (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.governing.com/news/headlines/why-not-let-
citizens-draft-their-own-legislation.html [https://perma.cc/JG9T-SPUL]. 
 234. See David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act:  Democracy Index 
Rulemaking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 96 (2005). 
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In the rulemaking context, more robust public comment requirements 
could lead to better rules.  It is uncontroversial to point out that no agency 
can claim to have complete information about, and fully understand every 
perspective on, any given issue.  Notice-and-comment rulemaking allows the 
public to enhance the information available to an agency by submitting 
studies, data, and analyses as well as by responding to other public 
comments—what has been called the “multidirectional flow of 
information.”235  With better access to information, agencies can craft rules 
that are more responsive to public needs and easier to implement for the 
regulated communities who have a hand in supplying public officials with 
information.  Literature on the subject shows a positive association between 
greater citizen engagement in rulemaking and economic prosperity.236  
Conversely, “poorly designed regulation can stifle economic activities and 
ultimately reduce economic growth.”237  A robust process of informational 
exchange can only take place where there is adequate notice, a real 
opportunity to comment, and a requirement that records related to 
rulemaking, including comments by outside parties, be made available to the 
public. 
B.  Arguments Against Codifying Local Administrative Procedure 
There are two main arguments against the expansion of local 
administrative procedure requirements:  First, localities have comparatively 
few resources and the costs of implementing procedures outweighs their 
public benefit.  Second, states could achieve a significant degree of 
uniformity by making their MSAPAs applicable to local agencies.  This 
section outlines and responds to each of these arguments. 
1.  Resource Constraints 
Enacting more extensive procedural requirements for rulemaking and 
adjudication will certainly cost cities and localities money.  Local 
governments typically have access to fewer resources, both in terms of 
dollars and staff time, than their state counterparts.  The average state budget 
is approximately $39 billion and the median budget is approximately $30 
billion.238  In comparison, Seattle’s budget is $5.3 billion239 and 
 
 235. COGLIANESE ET AL., supra note 227, at 17. 
 236. Johns & Saltane, supra note 12, at 4. 
 237. DAVID PARKER & COLIN KIRKPATRICK, MEASURING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE 42 
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 238. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 8 (2016), 
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 239. City Budget Office, Mayor Murray’s 2017–2018 Proposed Budget, SEATTLE.GOV 2 
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Philadelphia’s budget is approximately $4.4 billion.240  New York City, with 
an almost $85 billion budget that dwarfs that of most states, is an outlier.241  
As political subdivisions of states, it is not surprising that local governments 
are not as well resourced as their parent governments.  Faced with this 
daunting disparity, skeptics may question whether localities need or can even 
justify more extensive procedural requirements for administrative action. 
The objections that cities do not need rigorous administrative procedures, 
or that such procedures would be an unjustified drain on limited resources, 
can be answered in two ways.  First, it is important to remember that local 
governments will and must engage in administrative processes even in the 
absence of codified procedures for doing so.  Chicago, a city with an almost 
$10 billion budget242 and no administrative procedure act, lists almost one 
hundred rules on its official rulemaking portal.243  Codifying administrative 
procedures would not create governmental responsibilities and resource 
demands out of whole cloth, it would instead impose order and uniformity 
on processes in which agencies already engage.  In some cases, the 
uniformity provided by codified administrative procedures could increase 
efficiency as agencies adopt best practices and share strategies among 
themselves. 
Second, localities are free to adjust the level of administrative rigor to meet 
the resource constraints of their governments.  It must be remembered that 
“local government” is not a synonym for “large cities”—suburbs, counties, 
towns, villages, and other local governmental units must fit into the rubric as 
well.244  The approach taken by the 2010 MSAPA, which is organized into 
articles dealing with discrete issues, is instructive.  In addition, the MSAPA 
provides options for enacting bodies to choose from within particular 
provisions—for example, the section on regulatory analysis brackets out a 
dollar-amount impact threshold for enacting bodies to fill in.245  One 
government may choose to make the threshold very high because of the costs 
associated with careful regulatory analysis, and another may choose to omit 
the section to free agencies from the obligation altogether.  As the prefatory 
note to the 2010 MSAPA explains, “[a] model act is needed because state 
administrative law in the 50 states is not uniform, and there are a variety of 
approaches used in the various states.”246  The same principle would apply 
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to the constellation of local governments that currently lack a codified 
administrative procedure. 
2.  Applying State Administrative Procedure Acts 
to Local Jurisdictions 
It could be argued that states should simply make their procedural laws 
applicable to local agencies.  Indeed, this is already the case for adjudication 
in Pennsylvania.247  That state is not alone, as at least eight states apply their 
SAPAs to local agencies in certain circumstances, usually where contested-
case adjudications are involved.248  Despite the advances made in the home 
rule era, it is a fact of life for localities that they live in the shadow of state 
law.  Put more bluntly, “it will be the rare local official that will not be 
concerned about the possibility that their preferred course of action will run 
into legal problems either because of a lack of authority to initiate it or the 
specter that existing state law conflicts with it.”249  Many (it appears most) 
localities have no procedural statute at all.250  If uniformity promotes fairness 
and efficiency, why not achieve it for all localities statewide in one go by 
changing state law? 
Applying SAPAs to local jurisdictions could improve administrative 
processes and protections, but such an approach would rob localities of the 
flexibility to experiment and adapt processes to their own needs.  This issue 
can be illustrated for both rulemaking and adjudication processes.  In the case 
of adjudications, the stakes are often much higher for the parties involved, 
which is why the MSAPA and many SAPAs provide for quasi-judicial 
procedures in contested cases.251  In states that have robust and efficient 
adjudication procedures, there is a strong argument for applying those 
procedures to local agencies.  But a model statute could be structured to 
contain adjudication procedures in a stand-alone article that could be 
removed by enacting bodies in localities whose agencies are subject to SAPA 
with regard to adjudication.  Alternatively, a local government could craft its 
own unique procedural statute that is responsive to the idiosyncrasies of state 
 
 247. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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and local law.  Where the state statute does not preempt more protective 
measures, local governments may choose to enact a procedural statute for the 
purpose of adding additional procedural safeguards to the adjudication 
process.  In states that do not apply SAPA adjudication requirements to local 
agencies or, like Pennsylvania, mandate only a minimum of procedure that 
those bodies must meet, a local procedural statute crafted from scratch or 
adapted from a model statute would be an opportunity to establish a uniform 
and comprehensive hearing process for the first time. 
The argument for statewide uniformity is weaker in the case of 
rulemaking.  It is not clear that any city has identified the ideal minimum 
procedures for rulemaking, as evidenced by the variation among the three 
cities examined in Part II.  Moreover, flexibility is valuable for local 
governments.  New York City’s government probably has very different 
preferences regarding the length of notice, depth and frequency of regulatory-
impact analysis, methods for receiving public comments and the obligation 
to respond, and the necessity of public hearings than Buffalo’s 
government.252  Providing for a lengthy comment period and drafting 
substantive responses to comments may be an unsustainable strain for a town 
or village sanitation department and an absolute necessity for a public health 
department in a city of several hundred thousand people.  The absence of a 
state standard also allows cities to account for wide institutional variation by 
adapting procedural requirements to their particular governmental structure.  
The legislative bodies of localities are best equipped to adjust the levers and 
dials of administrative procedure to the particular situation of local agencies, 
just as state legislatures were, and are, best positioned to make those 
decisions for state agencies. 
IV.  TOWARD A REGULATORY AGENDA:  PAVING THE WAY FOR 
LOCALITIES 
For change to occur, localities must be given the tools to easily create 
robust administrative procedures.  The drafters of the MSAPA recognized 
that one of the model statute’s main benefits is that it “crystalliz[es] new 
concepts of best practices for the convenience of state lawmakers who do not 
have to reinvent the wheel.”253  After all, administrative law is not always at 
the forefront of legislators’ minds because “[v]ery few people have ever been 
elected to the state legislature . . . on a promise to revamp administrative 
procedure laws.”254  The political and electoral incentives to invent cutting-
edge administrative procedure laws from scratch are weak for both state and 
local elected officials.  This Part sketches three ways this incentive problem 
could be solved.  First, the legal community could draft a Model Local 
Administrative Procedure Act (MLAPA) similar to the MSAPA.  Second, 
localities could be encouraged to adapt the MSAPA to their own purposes by 
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mixing, matching, and adjusting its provisions.  Finally, local governments 
could be encouraged to draft their own statutes from the ground up. 
A.  Model Local Administrative Procedure Act 
The MSAPA provides a content and process roadmap for the development 
of a local model statute.  The idea of producing an MLAPA in the style of 
the MSAPA is not new.  In fact, the development of a local level analogue 
was proposed as early as 1966.255  An ideal model statute is flexible enough 
to be useful to the wide spectrum of local governments that vary in structure, 
size, and access to resources.256  The approaches already used by cities could 
inform the content of a statute.  New York City and Philadelphia both 
generally have lighter procedural requirements than the APA or the MSAPA, 
most likely as a result of the resource constraints discussed in Part III.B.1.  
Lightweight procedures are likely to be even more important for localities 
that are not large cities like those examined here. 
At a minimum, the MLAPA should provide procedures for rulemaking and 
adjudication.  Within those categories, drafters should strive to provide the 
widest possible menu of options for local lawmakers.  For example, a 
rulemaking article could include options for advance notices of rulemaking, 
standard notice-and-comment rules, direct final rules, negotiated rules, cost-
benefit analysis, and perhaps even new proposals like citizen rulemaking.257  
Articles addressing adjudication should separately provide for procedural 
safeguards and a central panel approach so that governments may adopt, 
adjust, or pass over the panel structure as best fits their needs.  Both items 
should be considered in light of the solutions that have already been devised 
and tried in large cities, as discussed in Part II.  For example, the Philadelphia 
approach that treats every rule, by default, like a direct final rule may be 
desirable for jurisdictions with limited resources to devote to long review and 
public comment processes.  Similarly, New York’s effort to make 
adjudication more easily understandable and accessible through OATH 
deserves consideration.258  Drafters should consult, but not constrain 
themselves to following precisely, the examples provided by the federal 
government, states, and localities.  Creating a new statute is an opportunity 
to build upon past structures with the aid of recent scholarship and 
comparative analyses.  These sources provide no shortage of models for 
measuring the effectiveness of administrative structures.259 
The MLAPA could be a vehicle for innovations that make administrative 
processes more transparent and responsive to the public.  The statute should 
include an article on public availability of documents, including official 
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codification of rules and publication of adjudicatory decisions.  This article 
should encourage localities to take advantage of new technologies by 
requiring, as a default, that information be made available online. 
Finally, the statute should include mechanisms to encourage thoughtful 
consideration and efficiency in administrative action.  New York’s 
requirement that agencies publish a regulatory agenda is a good example.260  
Like cost-benefit or regulatory-impact analysis, this requirement prods 
agencies to think carefully about what rules they plan to make and which 
rules already on the books are still serving useful purposes.  None of the cities 
examined here appear to have reached the perfect balance of lightweight but 
meaningful regulatory-impact analysis.  Unlike the federal government, 
localities most likely do not have an entity like OMB to examine rules and 
enforce an analysis requirement.  The MLAPA could follow the approach of 
the 2010 MSAPA, which requires the agency to engage in regulatory-impact 
analysis if it estimates that a rule would have a certain level of economic 
impact.261  Looking even further afield, the more generalized “impact 
assessments” done by European Union bodies are another alternative 
model.262  Similarly, the MLAPA could include a mechanism for periodic 
retrospective review of adopted rules to ensure that regulations are achieving 
measurable policy goals.  A limited version of this type of review exists in 
federal law, and it is becoming more common in countries around the 
world.263 
This Note does not address standards for judicial review of agency action 
because, in many cases, the standard of review for local agency action is set 
by state law.  In two of the three cities examined in Part II, state law supplies 
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the arbitrary and capricious standard of review for local agencies through 
provisions that replaced common-law writs in the nature of certiorari or 
mandamus.264  In Pennsylvania, by contrast, state law provides specific 
procedures and standards of review for local administrative decisions.265  
While this appears to be a common approach by states, state law does not 
always provide a judicial review backstop for local administrative decisions.  
In fact, it seems likely that the application of judicial review standards 
established by state law to local agencies was, in some cases, an effort to give 
the public ex post administrative protections where no codified ex ante 
procedures existed.  Drafters should explore this question more deeply to 
determine whether an article on judicial review would be useful.  Even if 
most localities are similarly subject to state law standards of judicial review, 
the MLAPA could provide some guidelines for agency responses to the 
initiation of judicial review, as Seattle’s statute does.266 
The MLAPA should be crafted by bringing together scholars, 
practitioners, agency officials, and other experts on local administrative law.  
The process itself will serve as an opportunity to pool knowledge and insights 
on the growing field of local administrative law.  In this way, drafting the 
MLAPA would advance scholarly development of the field while producing 
an end product that is useful to localities. 
NCCUSL’s process for developing the MSAPA is instructive as an 
example.  NCCUSL appoints a drafting committee of commissioners to give 
proposals extensive and in-depth consideration.267  Members may survey 
approaches taken by other jurisdictions, confer with staff and officials that 
have relevant experience, or take other steps to gather information and flesh 
out a proposal.  Once a draft is written, it must go through a rigorous review 
process that takes a minimum of two years and must be adopted by a majority 
vote of state representatives.268  Convening experts and adopting the kind of 
rigorous review process used by NCCUSL would be a lengthy endeavor and 
require a substantial investment of time and energy by those involved.  But, 
ultimately, this process would yield the strongest and most useful MLAPA 
possible while also serving as a vehicle for the advancement of local 
administrative law more generally. 
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of certiorari] is not full appellate review, but instead involves consideration only of whether, 
based on the administrative record, the tribunal’s decision was illegal or arbitrary and 
capricious.”). 
 265. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 751–54 (2018). 
 266. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 3.02.130 (2018) (allowing agencies to stay 
enforcement of orders pending judicial review, requiring agencies to produce certified copies 
of records for reviewing courts, and authorizing agencies to modify orders or decisions in 
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Creating a model statute for localities would greatly increase the chances 
of local governments acting to create new procedures legislatively.  
Providing a “cheat sheet” of administrative law best practices crafted 
specifically for localities takes much of the work out of the project for 
officials and increases the chance that legislation will actually be enacted.  
This section is just a rough sketch of essential elements that an MLAPA 
should include.  If experts come together to craft a statute, they will have 
many other items to contribute.  The MLAPA should include the widest 
variety of options possible to encourage localities to choose what is best for 
them.  Between the APA, MSAPA, existing local statutes, and even similar 
statutes from other countries, drafters will have a wealth of options to 
consider for inclusion. 
B.  Adapting the MSAPA for Local Governments 
Localities already have a comprehensive and successful model statute in 
the MSAPA.  Many of the concerns that motivated the drafting and revision 
of the MSAPA, including uniformity, ease of use by agency officials and the 
public, transparency, and bringing government procedures up to date with 
technology, apply with equal force at the local level.  Localities could adopt 
the MSAPA in whole or use it as a template to build upon and customize.  
Under the latter approach, localities could pioneer many of the innovations 
discussed as possible inspiration for the MLAPA in Part IV.A.  The MSAPA 
provisions could also be adapted for localities and applied through state law, 
though this is subject to many of the pitfalls discussed in Part III.B.2. 
C.  Home Brew Statutes 
Localities can use the wealth of administrative law knowledge and 
experience to craft new statutes best suited for their purposes.  Alternatively, 
states could engage with experts and their localities to develop a statute that 
can be applied through state law or given to localities to adapt and enact at 
their leisure.  Of course, developing such statutes would require a careful 
process of consultation with stakeholders and experts.  An expert on 
administrative law in Massachusetts recently suggested that the state needs a 
“detailed, thorough-going study on a local agency by agency basis to 
determine where uniformity can be achieved,” to produce a “uniform, 
comprehensive, standard local administrative procedure act that is 
specifically tailored to the realities of local administrative agency decision-
making in Massachusetts.”269  A model statute is useful, but by no means 
necessary, for localities and states to begin the process of local administrative 
procedure reform in their own jurisdictions. 
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CONCLUSION 
Fundamentally, what is right for a state government may not be right for a 
local government.  The recognition that levels of government have distinct 
needs and respond to distinct pressures underlays the parallel development 
of the APA and the MSAPA as different statutes, and that principle applies 
to the state-local divide as well.270  Just as “the structural and institutional 
context of the states is not Washington’s,” so the structural and institutional 
context of local governments is often not the state’s.271  States may well have 
a role to play by assisting localities to formalize their administrative 
procedures, or even mandating that they do so, but the unique needs of 
localities should remain paramount during this process. 
For the reasons discussed in this Note, cities and localities should move to 
codify administrative procedure for rulemaking and adjudication.  The legal 
community could assist this effort by drafting an MLAPA, encouraging 
localities to adapt the MSAPA to their purposes, or assisting localities in 
developing statutes responsive to their particular circumstances.  Any of 
these approaches would benefit local governments across the country that 
currently have no procedural requirements guiding agencies.  In addition, the 
process would bring together experts on local administrative law in a way 
that promises to promote the development of scholarly understanding of this 
area in new and useful ways.  The fact that many large cities lack any kind 
of procedural statute indicates that there is a real opportunity to improve the 
administrative processes affecting millions of people across the country. 
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